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The ability of a vehicle to navigate safely through any environment relies on its 
driver having an accurate sense of the future positions and goals of other vehicles on 
the road. A driver does not navigate around where an agent is, but where it is going 
to be. To avoid collisions, autonomous vehicles should be equipped with the ability 
to to derive appropriate controls using future estimations for other vehicles, 
pedestrians, or otherwise intentionally moving agents in a manner similar to or 
better than human drivers. Differential game theory provides one approach to 
generate a control strategy by modeling two players with opposing goals. 
Environments faced by autonomous vehicles, such as merging onto a freeway, are 
complex, but they can be modeled and solved as a differential game using discrete 
approximations; these games yield an optimal control policy for both players and 
can be used to model adversarial driving scenarios rather than average ones, so that 
autonomous vehicles will be safer on the road in more situations. Further, discrete 
approximations of solutions to complex games that are computationally tractable 
and provably asymptotically optimal have been developed, but may not produce 
usable results in an online fashion. To retrieve an efficient, continuous control 
policy, we use deep imitation learning to model the discrete approximation of a 
differential game solution. We successfully learn the policy generated for two games 
of different complexity, a fence escape and merging game, and show that the 
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For autonomous vehicles, precise navigation through dynamic environments 
is necessary for the safety of passengers, surrounding vehicles, and pedestrians. 
However, driving on a freeway, navigating city streets, or pulling into a 
neighborhood -- any real life driving scenarios -- are situations that add the 
additional difficulty of avoiding collisions in an environment with other intentional 
agents. An intentional agent is any object in an environment that moves according to 
its own attitudes, goals, and beliefs. Most importantly, an intentional agents’ choice 
of action is affected by the actions of other agents. All cars and pedestrians may be 
considered intentional agents, independent of whether they are autonomous or fully 
under human control. As humans, we are able to make assumptions about other 
agent’s intentions and, based on this knowledge, how these agents will move in 
reaction to our actions. The understanding of where others will be in reaction to 
ourselves allows us to manipulate the environment in our favor. To avoid collisions 
effectively, an autonomous vehicle must also be able to emulate this estimation of 
future positions and agent reactions within a continuous state and control space.  
Although it seems the straightforward choice, future positions of pedestrians 
or other cars on the road are not accurately estimated using solely object tracking 
algorithms. Object tracking assumes that the only intentional agent in the 
environment is the tracker. Other agents’ movements are assumed not to be affected 
by any actions taken, and it contains no structure to account for competitive actions 
taken in response some driver maneuver. It is possible that one agent may attempt 
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to prevent the actions of another in order to achieve its own goals faster, more easily, 
or to prevent the other from reaching its goal. In the case of highway driving, 
merging and changing lanes are both actions that require the cooperation of at least 
one other driver. It is possible that other drivers may merge from different lanes and 
reduce the merging space or speed up to make more room. A vehicle must have 
some kind of intent recognition in order to plan around anticipated reactions of 
other agents, especially when those agents may be competing against it. 
Differential game theory is turned towards instead to model actions and 
reactions in a given situation. Game theory provides a method of generating optimal 
controls in a multi-agent, competitive environment. With the publishing of their 
book  Theory of Games and Economic Behavior , John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern solidified the concept of mathematically determining an optimal way 
for either competing or cooperative players to behave in games of choice (Neumann 
and Morgenstern). Players create a strategy, or series of decisions, that results in 
some return of value to each player at the end of the game. The strategy that is 
superior to any other is considered the optimal strategy. A greedy policy, chosen 
with respect to this optimal strategy, is guaranteed to be the optimal optimal policy. 
The original formulation of game theory by Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
is not applicable to autonomous vehicles as the physical dynamics of vehicles are not 
accounted for. It is more appropriate to apply differential game theory (Isaacs). 
Representing two player games with ordinary differential equations leads to 
strategies that are expressed as a series of choices in continuous time, rather than as 
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a sequence of steps. Several authors  have previously presented papers utilizing the 
optimal controls generated by differential games relating to vehicle behavior, such as 
naval collision avoidance, but the optimal controls generated by these algorithms are 
practically implementable for more complex problems (Ho, Yu-Chi, et al.). The 
solutions presented by these algorithms require large amounts of calculation to 
obtain in continuous space. They can, however, be discretely approximated, but then 
produce large tables of state and action values that take up large amounts of 
memory for complex problems. While the obtained strategies are guaranteed to be 
optimal, a more efficient solution needs to be developed for realtime, limited space 
situations. 
Another method of learning an optimal way to avoid collisions is through 
machine learning. Deep neural networks are currently a popular choice in research 
to perform many functions in the autonomous car industry. Variations of deep 
neural networks are being explored as collision detection, lane navigation, and full 
end-to-end navigation control, and large amounts of data for these problems can be 
collected by human drivers or simulated to train complex models (Xu, Huazhe, et al.; 
Chen and Huang; Wang, Pin, and Chan). More recently, improvements in imitation 
learning, learning an end-to-end policy, have enabled successful models to learn 
sequences of actions better than supervised learning alone. However, the data to 
train models is often collected for ideal situations, where autonomous vehicles seek 
to avoid objects in their environment and abide by the rules of the road while 
assuming that other vehicles are cooperating. A method of determining what to do 
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in an adversarial situation is necessary while there are still humans sharing the road 
with autonomous vehicles. 
In order to take advantage of the optimal control strategies offered by game 
theory in adversarial conditions without requiring large amounts of real time 
processing, and data storage, we propose modeling the results of game theory with 
deep imitation learning. Strategies generated by differential game theory consist of a 
series of states and actions which can be used as data to train a neural network in a 
supervised fashion. A test if this combination would produce reasonably accurate 
results was created, and two differential pursuit-evasion games were created for an 
application of game theory to generate optimal controls and train an imitation 
learning model. 
A simple fence escape game and a more dynamically complex vehicle merging 
game were defined to test the architecture of our solution and to see if it would 
generalize to more complex game environments. Optimal actions for states in each 
game are calculated using a variation of the iterative iGame algorithm developed by 
Mueller and Zhu. Once collected, these state-action pairs are used to train a deep 
neural network model using an implementation of DAgger. Additionally, a 
reinforcement learning algorithm was applied to the results of the fence escape 
game to further optimize its control policy. 
The model learned an accurate representation of the game theory generated 
policy, and was able to provide controls twice as quickly. The success of the model 
indicates that collecting optimal action training data from game theory could be a 
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good method of training neural networks on cars to navigate situations where ideal 
behavior cannot be expected from the environment around them. 
2. Background and Related Works 
The combination of differential game theory and machine learning is 
proposed given two functions; the ability of differential game theory to provide the 
optimal control policy for players in a given game environment, and the ability of a 
neural network to learn a policy provided by an expert. In order to provide a 
foundation for understanding this work, both of these concepts are delved into 
individually before introducing how they work together. An introduction to the 
relevant game and differential game theories and current solutions are presented 
first, followed by a short tutorial on neural networks, deep learning, and imitation 
learning. Then, recent works related to game theory and machine learning for 
autonomous cars specifically are explored. The contributions of our work in the 
form of the connection between game theory and machine learning is discussed 
with relation to these references. 
2.1 Differential Game Theory 
Game theory is a mathematical method for calculating the best actions a 
player can take while playing a game. In this case, a game is any situation involving 
two or more players that make choices where he results of all players choices result 
in some value return to the players. In many games, players’ actions result in a 
benefit to themselves and a cost to their opponent. One such famous game is the 
prisoner’s dilemma. Two prisoners that have been arrested for some crime have the 
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option to either betray the other’s involvement, or remain silent. Their prison 
sentences are decided based on the combination of their responses, but they cannot 
communicate with each other. For example, if both prisoners remain silent, they 
both serve a year in prison, but if prisoner A betrays prisoner B and prisoner B 
remains silent, the betrayer will not serve any prison time while the silent prisoner 
will have to serve three years (Selten). A diagram of the typical rewards for a 
prisoner’s dilemma is included in table 1. 
Table 1: A formulation of the prisoner’s dilemma. Prisoners have two choices of 
action that determine their number of years in prison. The number of years in 
prison is represented as a negative reward value. 
Prisoner A \ Prisoner B Betray Stay Silent 
Betray -2 \ -2 0 \ -3 
Stay Silent -3 \ 0 -1 \ -1 
 
The goal of a prisoner in the prisoner’s dilemma is to earn the least amount 
of prison time, so they wish to discover which action is the best action to take to 
achieve that goal. A player’s action choice is referred to as that player’s strategy, and 
the strategy that results in a greater reward than any other strategy is the dominant 
strategy or  optimal strategy  (Issacs). The goal of game theory is to calculate an 
optimal strategy for one or all players in the game. 
The solution to a game can be found according to multiple criteria. On one 
hand, a game could be said to be solved when the player’s strategies reach an 
equilibrium . An equilibrium is reached when a strategy is found for both players that 
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cannot be improved, however the definition of improved changes equilibrium 
points. Nash Equilibrium for example, defines lack of improvement as when neither 
player can increase their reward by changing their strategy while the other players’ 
remain constant. Alternatively, the trembling hand perfect equilibrium takes into 
account when players may make unintentional choices, or tremble (Stelton). 
Alternatively, the solution of a game can be determined with a minimax function. In 
this way, different solution concepts can lead to different strategies for players in a 
game, but would still result in a solved game. The prisoner’s dilemma, however, is a 
very simple game and changing solution criteria does not lead to a different solution. 
Prisoner’s dilemma can also be played iteratively: each prisoner makes the 
choice to betray or stay silent more than once and attempts to maximize their 
rewards over time rather than just for a single game instance. The strategy that a 
player forms to choose actions based on the state of the game over time can also be 
referred to as a  policy . Different policies result in different rewards, so, similar to 
strategies, the policy that earns a player more reward than any other policy is the 
optimal policy. If optimal policies could be generated for games of vehicles 
interacting on the road, an autonomous vehicle could maximize a reward related to 
avoiding collisions. However, general game theory does not have any knowledge of 
the kinematics that players are bound by. Solutions to these games cannot be applied 
to autonomous vehicles as they map actions directly to reward values. In order to 




In a differential game, players are described according to their possible 
states, kinematic equations, and control inputs. Unlike in traditional game theory 
where players choose actions and receive some reward, players instead choose their 
control inputs as their strategies and change their state in the game according to 
their kinematic equations while attempting to reach some defined goal. Goals do not 
have to be to move towards a static location, they can include intercepting or 
avoiding a moving target, and players can have cooperative or adversarial goals. An 
advantage to this formulation of a game is that when a differential game is solved, 
both players will have optimal control policies that describe optimal paths for them 
to take towards their goals. 
Isaacs originally developed and solved differential games to apply them to 
military applications (Isaacs). He provided several examples of the use of 
pursuit-evasion games, where the goal of one player, the pursuer, is to capture or cut 
off the evader player, whose goal is usually to avoid the pursuer. A common 
pursuit-evasion game is called the homicidal chauffeur. The pursuer is fashioned 
after a vehicle that has a high top speed but large turning radius and the evader is a 
pedestrian with low top speed but small turning radius. The solution to the game 
depends on whether the game is posed as a  game of kind or  game of degree. Games 
of degree have a continuum of outcomes, often solutions provide the controls of a 
player or the time until capture, whereas solutions to a game of kind report a finite 
outcome of a game, such as whether a player will win or lose based on starting 




Figure 1: An illustration of the homicidal chauffeur game in a reduced state 
space. The pursuer P has to get within distance r of E to win the game. Players 
control their velocity and turning radius. 
 
2.2 Differential Game Solutions 
Optimal interception strategies for collision avoidance and capture can be 
modeled and solved as a pursuit-evasion game. The solution to a differential game 
can take the form of the optimal value function, optimal control policy, or optimal 
path, and any one of these solution formulations can be used to derive the others 
(Isaacs). Solving a differential game, rather than a traditional game, as a game of 
degree will provide an autonomous vehicle with a useable control policy for collision 
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avoidance in various situations, however, the solutions to a differential game are not 
as easily calculated. 
To derive a solution to a differential game in the continuous space that it is 
defined in, Isaacs defined the  Main Equation . A generally nonlinear, first-order 
partial differential equation, the  Main Equation is a function of the kinematics and 
controls equations of all the players in a game. When solved it provides a true 
solution to the game. It is, however, difficult or impossible to solve computationally 
for complex games. In all of the previously mentioned games, solutions relied on a 
great deal of pre-calculating equations and attempts to simplify the kinematic 
equations (Exarchos; Pachter and Yavin; Lewin and Olsder). Directly solving the 
Main Equation becomes impossible for more complex games. In such a vein, games 
designed for an autonomous vehicle, even simplified, are likely to yield a  Main 
Equation that is too complex to solve computationally. 
Fortunately, differential games’ solutions can be obtained numerically. Using 
higher order derivations of the value function, to reduce the complexity of the  Main 
Equation,  and the development of the “multiple shooting method” have provided 
more computationally viable solutions (Lachner; Morrison et al.). However, some of 
the most computationally successful numerical solutions involve sampling based or 
discrete approximations. 
Several sampling based methods can be used to solve games, but exhibit 
varying levels of accuracy and refinement. Algorithms like Rapidly-exploring 
Random Trees, or RRT*, are built upon randomly sampling states from the available 
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state space. RRT* is  used to generate optimal motion planning. It is important to 
note, however, that RRT* creates an open-loop strategy rather than the closed-loop 
strategy that is usually generated by pursuit-evasion games (Karaman, Sertac, and 
Frazzoli). Viability theory has also been applied to approximate a value function as a 
sampling based method (Cardaliaguet, Pierre, et al.).  Multi-grid, successive 
approximation approaches, such as the one used alongside viability theory by 
Cardaliaguet, are successful at discretely approximating the value of games, but are 
limited in accuracy by a predefined and static grid resolution. 
To leverage incremental sampling as well as viability theory in order to 
improve on multi-grid approximation methods, iGame*, was developed (Mueller, 
Erich, et al). iGame* operates similarly to Cardaliaguet’s method, but refines the grid 
resolution each iteration to the smallest grid that all previously sampled points fit 
on, allowing the accuracy of the algorithm to increase the longer it runs. iGame* 
maintains this grid in order to create the value function for a game. This value 
function is represented as each sampled state having its own value. 
iGame* as presented is faster than the previous multi-grid methods, and its 
asymptotic convergence is formally insured for all states, meaning that as time 
approaches infinity, iGame* will produce the optimal value function. From the 
approximated value function, iGame* can also generate the control policy that is 
greedy with respect to the value, and if that value function is optimal then the 
resulting policy will also be optimal (Sutton and Barto).  For these reasons, iGame* is 
chosen to generate solutions to the proposed autonomous vehicle differential games. 
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iGame* generates solutions well; however, its discrete solution needs to be modeled 
in the continuous space, or have some form of policy compression applied to the 
results in order to avoid comparing states from a table of thousands of points in a 
real-time collision avoidance environment. Using deep learning to learn the policy 
with imitation learning accomplishes both of these objectives. 
2.3 Deep Learning 
Deep learning is one way to accomplish machine learning, or getting an 
algorithm to learn from experience. A deep learning algorithm is built to fulfill the 
definition of machine learning as a connection between several neural networks. 
Broadly, machine learning is the ability for an algorithm to improve its 
performance on a task T, with respect to some performance measure P, given 
exposure to some experience E (Mitchell). As far as the task T is concerned, machine 
learning can be applied to problems such as classification, regression, translation, or 
anomaly detection, among other fields. The network built to learn iGame*’s policy is 
a classifier, identifying which is the proper control input to take given an input state. 
Formally, this classifier is tasked with producing a function f:Rn -> {y1, y2, …, yk} 
such that when given a state x the model will produce an appropriate y from the set 
of available controls (Goodfellow, Ian, et al.). Classification is a subset of supervised 
learning. In supervised learning, every element of a training dataset is accompanied 
by a label and provides the experience, E, part of machine learning. Specifically, a set 
of elements {x1:y1, x2:y2, …, xi:yi}, where xi is a feature observation and yi is its 
label, is used to train a network. 
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One of the simplest neural networks is one that performs linear regression. 
Although classification is the goal of the network created to model iGame*, the 
construction of a linear regressor is similar and provides a good introduction to the 
machine learning concepts that are necessary to extend into deep learning. 
Following is a condensed explanation of a simple network, based primarily on the 
work in Goodfellow, Bengio, and Courville’s Deep Learning book, which can be 
referenced for more in depth information about different types of neural networks. 
The task, T, of a linear regressor is to predict the value of a scalar y ∈ R from 
an input vector x ∈ R n . The model should output ŷ, an estimation of y, following the 
equation: 
, w x bŷ =  T
 
+   
where  w  is a vector of  weights, w ∈ R n  , that are applied to x to determine the 
estimated ŷ, and  b is a  bias applied to the formula. Weights decide how much 
emphasis a feature in x has on the final prediction; changing the values of individual 
weights affects whichever feature it is multiplied with. Values can be: (1) positively 
valued, which increases ŷ, (2) negatively valued, decreasing ŷ, or (3) zero, causing no 
effect to the final value. If the input expands in feature size,  w can also be a matrix.  
The regressor also needs some way to measure performance, P. A common 
performance measure for linear regressors is mean squared error. Given the 









Since the MSE is larger when ŷ and y are farther apart, and smaller when they are 
similar, the regressor can be said to perform better when the output of MSE is 
smaller. With a performance measure defined, the regressor needs some way to 
change the weights  w and bias  b after observing labeled data, the experience E, to 
minimize the MSE. 
Gradient descent is the most commonly used method of updating w. Taking 
the derivative of the cost function yields its slope, or gradient, and given that 
information the values in the w vector can be updated to “descend” the slope of the 
cost function towards the minimum value. Effectively, after evaluating each data 
point in the training dataset, gradient descent can be run to update w before the 
next evaluation. Updates to  w  and  b are scaled with a learning rate parameter to 
control how much the weights are changed each iteration. Note that on large 
datasets, gradient descent can be very slow, as it runs in O(n) time, so  stochastic 
gradient descent is usually run on mini-batches of examples selected uniformly from 
the dataset instead of updating after every evaluation. 
Simple machine learning solutions, like the linear regressor, can be powerful 
tools, but cannot be generalized to solve many complex problems. Deep learning was 
created to overcome problems like the  curse of dimensionality , the number of 
distinct configurations of a set of inputs can be much larger than the number of 
available training examples, and the  local consistency prior,  that learned functions 
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are assumed to change very little within a small region, along with other problems 
that hinder generalization (Goodfellow, Ian, et al.).  
Deep neural networks can be thought of as a series of functions, like the 
linear regressor, that are chained together. Each function makes up a layer of the 
network, and the output from one function is passed on to the next, until the last 
layer’s function produces an output. For example, three functions in a chain would 
form,   f(x) = f 3 (f 2 (f 1 (x))).  The number of layers in a network is the network’s depth. 
Figure 2 is a sample diagram of a 3 layer  deep feedforward network. In a feedforward 
network, the input, x, is only passed through each layer once in a straight line, as 
visible in the diagram. Layers that are not first or last,  f 2  in the figure, are called 
hidden layers ; during training, these layers are used to find the best approximation 
of  f(x) . 
 
Figure 2: An illustration of a feedforward deep neural network. This network has 
three layers, two linear functions and a sigmoid function. The inclusion of a sigmoid 
function as the final layer means that this could function as a binary classifier. 
 
Like in the linear regressor, deep networks are also updated using gradient 
descent. The chain rule is used to propagate changes to all weights and biases in the 
network working backwards from the last layer to the first in a process that is aptly 
known as  back propagation. Networks can be made as large or as small as needed to 
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learn a dataset, and functions do not have to remain linear. More complex networks 
can learn vast amount of associations. 
2.4 Previous Deep Learning for Autonomous Vehicles 
Variations of supervised learning are used in many neural networks intended 
for autonomous applications. Variations of deep neural networks are being explored 
as collision detection, lane navigation, and full end-to-end navigation control, as 
large amounts of data to train complex models for these problems can be collected 
by human drivers or simulated (Wang, Pin and Chan) (Xu, Huazhe, et al.) (Bojarski, 
Mariusz, et al.). The Next Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS-X) 
family of systems, for example, is a deep neural net explored by a Stanford team as a 
policy compression algorithm to reduce the memory requirements for air traffic 
collision avoidance tables. the purposes of policy compression, with particular 
success seen by the Next Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS X) 
family of machine learning solutions ( Kochenderfer, Mykel, Holland, and 
Chryssanthacopoulos ). However, pure supervised learning is not the most accurate 
way to train a deep learning network. There is an assumption that each new state is 
independent of the last. In truth, the next state relies on the previous state 
estimation and chosen controls. In practice, a model that makes a mistake can result 
in experiencing a state that it was never trained on. The model would be forced to 
guess at the best controls to make from the new state, most likely inaccurately, 
leading to compounding errors. To avoid models "getting off track", the DAgger 
architecture was created to train a better imitation learner (Ross, Stephane, et al.). 
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DAgger progressively limits the student learner's policies and action selection until 
it can no longer create off track policies. 
Imitation learning can be used to learn a policy accurately, but the choice of 
policy to learn is also important. Most current applications of machine learning to 
control autonomous vehicles train on human collected data, either generating a 
simulation based on an aggregate of controls or training directly from human 
provided input to go with state or image data, but the data does not reflect 
adversarial situations. Most adversarial research aims to control for attempts at 
deceiving sensor input rather than avoid collisions with a potentially adversarial 
driver ( Szegedy, Christian, et al.;  Huang, Sandy, et al.; Gu, Shixiang, and Rigazio.). Our 
method seeks to generate optimal control strategies for worst case scenarios rather 
than average driving ones, so that autonomous vehicles will be safer on the road. 
3. Approach 
To create a control policy for an autonomous vehicles that considers 
intentional agents, a situation is modeled as a differential game,  iGame* is used to 
approximate the value function and corresponding greedy policy, then an 
implementation of DAgger trains a student to imitate iGame*'s policy. The setup of 
this system is detailed from start to final output considering the connections 
between each section. The definition of a differential game in a way that is usable by 
iGame* is covered first, followed by a description of the iGame* and DAgger 




3.1 Differential Game Setup 
A pursuit-evasion game can be used to model many of the situations faced by 
an autonomous vehicle, but it must be defined in such a way that it can be solved in 
iGame*. Recall, a differential game is defined with a set of ordinary differential 
equations that describe the dynamics of the game environment. These equations are 
functions of the current state and controls of the system, at a time t, for each agent in 
the environment. Each agent is governed by its own equation and controls, but the 
state for the entire game is based on the state information of every player at the 
current time. Several subsets of the state space must be defined for use in iGame*. 
 The set of all possible states in the state space are defined as X, where X ∈ 
ℝ N . The specific state that is represented at time t is x(t). For  two-player games, we 
consider a pursuer player and an evader player which have different goals. The 
pursuer wishes to move the system from the initial state, x(0), into a set of states 
where the evader loses the game X bad . The evader, meanwhile, wishes to move to a 
winning set of states, X goal  , while remaining free from X bad . X free  is considered to be a 
constraint set where the game is neither in a winning or losing state, X free  ≐ 
closure(X - X bad ). 
The controls space of the differential game must also be defined. Both players 
control the system through their choice of strategies in order to achieve their stated 
goals. Let sets U and W represent the control strategies of an evader and pursuer, 
respectively, and be defined as: 
U ≜ { u(.) : [0, +∞) -> U, measurable} 
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W ≜ { w(.) : [0, +∞) -> W, measurable} 
where U ⊂ ℝ ma  and W ⊂ ℝ md .  
Finally, the following equation would define the dynamical system: 
x’(t) = f(x(t), u(t), w(t)), 
where x’(t) denotes the next state and u(t) ∊ U and w(t) ∊ W. The set of kinematic 
equations that move the state according to the control values are defined 
individually for each game considering the players and environment. With the 
dynamics of the system defined, computing the value function of the resulting game 
is the job of iGame*.  
After defining the differential game, the controls and kinematic equations can 
be used in iGame* to approximate the optimal value function and control policy. 
Give a vague overview of iGame*, dispersion, the values each state carries 
around...iGame*, that runs even faster by utilizing cascade update rules. Instead of 
updating every sampled point when a new one is generated, iGame* maintains a set 
of directed trees where the new point is inserted as a child of the nearest, lowest 
value neighbor within a defined ball distance. Children are decided with an updated 
VI function VI*. Updates are only triggered when a node’s child changes their 
estimates or is added, or if an update has not been done for a defined amount of 
consecutive iterations. 
As input, iGame* requires: I, the number of iterations to run, M, the, l, the 
Lipschitz constant of the dynamical system equation, alpha, any positive scalar to be 
used in the calculation of the time discretization, D, the maximum number of 
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iterations allowed before a state must have its value updated, and (Beta), a constant 
used in the generation of the dispersion of the state space. The algorithm starts by 
generating an initial set of random samples in the state space X, S0. Each of these 
initial states are assigned a random value between 0 and 1 and their update Flag is 
set to 0. The estimated values of each state also are assigned 0.  
On each step of the remainder of the n iterations, a new sample is uniformly 
randomly generated within X and added to the existing set of states S. Based on the 
current iteration and input constant (Beta) a new dispersion value, d n ,  is calculated. 
d n  is considered the resolution of the finite grid that the elements of S n  lie on, and 
can be defined as: for any x (in) X free  (exists) x’ such that distance between x and x’ is 
less than d n . The authors provided a lemma defining an upper and lower bound for 
the value of d n , and chose to calculate d n  as the lower bound as it could be calculated 
offline; the math is reflected in line 8 of the algorithm. From d n  and the input values 
of M and l, values for the time discretization, h n , and dilation size, α n  are also 
calculated that are used for determining how long a timestep is for the purposes of 
calculating controls and determining a search radius for neighbors around a state, 
respectively. 
After calculating all the necessary variables, iGame* moves into several loops 
that modify the values of states in S depending on various factors. First, existing 
states are checked if they need to be updated. For each state x in S n-1 , newest 
sampled state excluded, if x has reached the maximum number of iterations since 
updating, or the child of x has just been updated, add x to the set of states that 
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require updates, Kn. Next, for the states in Kn that are  not  within X goal  values are 
updated according to the VI* algorithm, which solves a single step game. The 
algorithm of VI* is detailed in fig. 3. 
Within VI*, the single step game at the current point is solved. The solution to 
this game is to discover which state in S, within a reachable distance, is of best value 
to move to considering both the controls of the evader and the pursuer. To do this, a 
maximin function searches for a saddle point that minimizes the estimated value 
with respect to the evader’s available controls while maximizing it with respect to 
the pursuer’s controls. Two separate sets of controls choices are available to the 
evader and pursuer. It does not matter whether the maximin function makes a list of 
the evader’s or the pursuer’s controls choices first, as either way the same saddle 
point will be discovered (Isaacs).  In the original VI* algorithm, a new possible 
control value is added to the controls set for the evader every iteration, but to reduce 
the computation time a subset of the control space is sampled once and this 
discretization is used for the remainder of the algorithm. 
 
Figure 3: The VI* algorithm. The algorithm solves a maximin function for a single 
point in a game’s space, leading to an update to the assigned value and controls of 
that state (Mueller, Erich, et al. “Anytime Computation Algorithms for 




After calculating a solution to the single-step games at each of the state points 
that needed their value updated, iGame* continues to update the values of states 
based on two additional criteria 
The next loop updates the states in S that are not in Kn or Xgoal. Each of these 
states have a child state assigned to them such that the state’s child is the state 
within the defined ball distance with the lowest value. The new value of the chosen 
state will match the previous value of the child. Note that in this loop no controls are 
calculated to navigate between this state and its new child. Whatever controls are 
calculated for the state in VI* remain the same. The iterations until update flag is 
increased, and iGame* moves on to its final loop. 
Finally, iGame* considers the last subset of states in S, those that are within a 
single step of Xgoal. These states follow a simple update rule; their next value is 





Figure 4: The algorithm for iGame*, a iterative sampling discrete approximator that 
solves differential games (Mueller, Erich, et al. “Anytime Computation Algorithms for 
Approach-Evasion Differential Games”). 
 
When iGame* has finished running, it produces a set of states with attached 
information. Each sampled state has an associated value and calculated control value 
that is saved in a python dictionary and written to file. The values of each state can 
be used to visualize the value function of the game and verify its correctness, 
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however, it is the saved control values that are used to train the imitation learner to 
produce a similar policy. 
3.3 Deep Imitation Learner Setup 
Once iGame* has generated its set of sampled state and control inputs, an 
imitation learner can be trained to model the discrete policy created by iGame* in 
continuous space. As mentioned previously, DAgger is the framework that was 
chosen to train a model on the policy. Its pseudo code is included in fig. 5 but the 
algorithm is also explained briefly. To train a policy that will perform sequence 
prediction without dooming a model to being unable to recover from a mistake, 
DAgger starts by initializing a dataset of collected trajectories Ɗ. This set is initially 
empty but is filled with trajectories generated from the first provided policy,  1 , theπ
︿
 
expert’s. In this case, iGame*’s policy will provide the expert policy. The next policy, 
 2 , is produced by a student classifier trained to mimic the trajectories generated byπ
︿
 
the expert. This new policy is used to generate more trajectories to add to what 
already exists in Ɗ. For each iteration n DAgger repeats this process, using  n  toπ
︿
 
generate more trajectories for Ɗ then training the student to create the next policy, 
 n+1 , to mimic the whole dataset Ɗ. When all iterations are completed, the finalπ
︿
 





Figure 5: Pseudo code for the dataset agregator algorithm, DAgger. DAgger trains a 
policy on iterations of generated trajectories (Ross, Stephane, et al.). 
 
The classifier mentioned in the pseudo code is the student attempting to 
learn the policy, and any choice of student for a classifier would suffice. A 
feedforward, deep neural network, with three fully connected linear layers is used as 
the student for both of the test cases presented. It is implemented using the pytorch 
machine learning library in Python. The network uses MSE as its loss function and 
the Adam optimizer provided by pytorch, and for both of the test cases trains for 
2000 epochs with a minibatch size of 64. The final output of DAgger is a model of the 
policy generated by iGame*. The model accepts as input a state in the game space 
and outputs its learned control inputs for the evader and pursuer from that state.  
3.4 Performance Guarantees 
The combination of iGame* and DAgger algorithms results in a system that 
generates and learns policies for differential games; these learned policies will be 
near optimal due to the performance guarantees of both algorithms. While iGame* is 
proven asymptotically optimal in running time, it is also shown to globally converge 
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from any initialized values of the initial random sampling of states. From two 
assumptions about the input and setup of iGame*, assumptions 2.1 and 3.1, the 
authors propose their theorem of convergence (Mueller, Erich, et al.). The following 
properties are said to hold for 2.1:  
1. the sets of positions and controls, X, U, and W, are compact 
2. the function f that defines the dynamical system is Lipschitz continuous in 
x for any (u,w) ∈ U × W 
3. for any pair of x ∈ X and u ∈ U, F(x,u) is convex where the set-valued map 
F(x,u) ≜ ⋃ w ∈W f(x,u,w)  
Assumption 3.1 requires the definition of an integer D, D ≥ 0, such that each state 
sample invokes VI* at least once every D+1 iterations and for any iteration n ≥ 1, the 
set of sampled states S n . Given these two assumptions, it holds that the ⋃  K  ⊆ Ds=0 n+s  
sequence of values v n  converges to the optimal value function v* for any x ∈ X: 
. As the number of iterations approaches the limit, (x)  v (x)v * =  lim
n→+∞
min
y ∈ B(x,d ) ∩S   n n n  
the difference between v* and v n  goes to 0. As such, when run for a significant 
amount of iterations, iGame* will produce a near optimal value function and control 
policy. 
DAgger has its own performance guarantees which bound the loss and regret, 
or the variation of distance between states observed by the expert and learned 
policies in hindsight. Lemma 4.1 in the DAgger publication defines an inequality that 
bounds the distance between state distributions d over T steps, given that willπ  
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execute  over T steps with probability : . This lemmaπ︿ 1 β ) ( −  i
T Tβd  d||
|




|i ≤ 2 i  
is used in their proof of theorem 4.1; there exists a policy  in DAgger,π︿   
, ∈ π   s.t  E  [ℓ(s, )]  γ  [n  TΣ β ]π︿ ︿1:N s~dπ︿ π
︿ ≤  εN +  N +  N
2ℓmax




where is the loss,  is the loss of the best policy in hindsight, is the [ℓ(s, )]E π︿  εN γ N  
average regret of all generated policies, is the upper bound on loss, and is theℓmax nβ  
largest iteration such that (Ross, Stephane, et al.). For any input distribution,βn > 1T  
some policy achieves a surrogate loss of under its own state distribution in theε  
limit. The authors also address a finite sample case wherein a similar bound of the 
loss is calculated. With iGame* able to produce a near optimal policy, a DAgger 
taught imitation learner will be able to imitate the same policy with minimal regret. 
4. Test Cases 
4.1 Fence Escape Game 
Our first attempt to imitate iGame*'s policy was with a pursuit-evasion fence 
escape game. This game was selected first as its state space is simple and the 
solution is easy to observe without involving any pre-calculations. Two players start 
the game at random points in a plane along a fence of some defined length. The 
evader wants to reach the end of the fence and escape, but the pursuer can prevent 
its escape by remaining within a set capture distance from the evader. Figure 6 is an 




Figure 6: The fence escape game has two players, a pursuer p and evader e. The 
evader’s goal is to get around the fence to the grey shaded X goal  without being within 
the dashed capture zone of the pursuer. 
 
The pursuer and evader system is defined by the following differential 
equations: 
x_p'(t) = x_p(t)*w(t) 
x_e'(t) = x_e(t)*u(t), 
where x_p and x_e are the positions of the pursuer and evader and w and u are their 
respective controls. A state of the game at time t is represented as the pair of 
position points of x_p and x_e.  Each player directly controls their velocities,w = vel_p 
and u = vel_e. Both players move only along the x axis in either the positive or the 
negative direction; the controls values for velocity are constrained between [-1,1]. 
This implementation of the fence escape game used a fence of length 10 
where the fence starts at position 0 and ends at 10. The players’ states are confined 
between -1 and 11. iGame* variables. DAgger is configured to run trajectory length, 
how many initial trajectories and rounds to run, and how many rounds and 





4.2 Merging Cars Game 
A pursuit-evasion game with more complex states was our second test of 
policy imitation learning. This merging game is a model of two vehicles in an 
everyday situation, the evader is merging onto a single-lane highway that already 
has the pursuing vehicle on it. In this situation, the evader wants to reach the gray 
X goal  without colliding with the pursuer after exiting the on-ramp. The pursuer is 
attempting to accomplish the worst case scenario of trying to run into the evader. 
Figure 7 illustrates the merging game. 
 
 
Figure 7: The merging game models an interaction between two cars, a pursuer p, 
already on the highway, and a merging evader, e. The evader wishes to merge 
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successfully by proceeding to the grey shaded X goal , located after position 4, without 
colliding with the pursuer between positions 3 and 4. 
 
The dynamical system of the merging game is defined as: 
x_p'(t) = x_p(t)*v_p(t) 
x_e'(t) = x_e(t)*v_e(t) 
v_p'(t) = v_p(t)*w(t) 
v_e'(t) = v_e(t)*u(t). 
States for the game are made up of sets of 4 variables, the positions and 
velocities of the evader and pursuer [x_p, v_p, x_e, v_e]. Both evader and pursuer 
control their acceleration, w = accel_p and u = accel_e, constrained between values of 
[-0.2, 1.2]. Several state constraints apply to both players as well. Vehicles’ positions 
must be between 0 and 5, and their velocities cannot exceed 1.2 or be lower than -.2. 
Since the horizontal position of the vehicles is controlled by the road, it is sufficient 
to model vehicle position with a single variable. 
The merging game setup is not reflective of the complexity of real life 
environments, but the increase in complexity from the fence escape game to the 
merge game shows that our imitation learner can generalize to more difficult to 
solve cases. 
5. Evaluation 
5.1 Fence Escape Game 
To ensure a simple policy was learnable by the imitation student, an instance 
of the iGame* algorithm was created utilizing the dynamics of the fence escape 
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game. The dynamical system is used to construct the value function and policy in the 
form of labeled states. Each sampled state has a corresponding value and control 
inputs stored with it in a python style dictionary. The output of iGame* in the form of 
an approximated value function is shown in fig. 8, where the values of each state are 
plotted with respect to the pursuer and evader positions. A line appears through the 
center of the diagram marking the states from which the evader will lose. Based on 
this value function, iGame* generates a control policy. The paired states and control 




Figure 8: The estimated value function for the fence escape game. The x-axis is the 
position of the pursuer and the y-axis is the position of the evader. A clear line is 
observed through the states in the center of the diagram where the value is 1 and 
the evader loses the game. 
 
With DAgger configured to run using 20 total rounds and generating 100 
trajectories per round, the deep learning student was taught the generated policy. 
The student produces comparable outputs, and manages to do so with considerable 
speed up from referencing iGame*'s dictionary of states directly. On average in 
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simulation, generating pursuer and evader control inputs from iGame*'s policy 
requires 83.1 milliseconds to complete a game, while it takes the imitation student 
41.8ms, making it 49.7% faster. Some of the speed increase may be due to the 
implementation of iGame* as a dictionary lookup in Python; however, the more 
complex merging game shows that the imitation student is able to generalize in the 
increased state space and compress the policy, reducing the time required more than 
iGame* is able. 
Additionally for this game, reinforcement learning was applied as a second 
machine learning algorithm to further optimize the control policy. Using Proximal 
Policy Optimization (PPO), a model was learned directly from playing the game from 
the perspective of the evader(Schulman, John, et al.). The resulting model won the 
winnable games it played 95% of the time. Although PPO specifically addresses how 
difficult it can be to tune reinforcement learning algorithms, some tuning is still 
necessary, and additional adjustments could yield a 100% accurate model. With 
such a model, the DAgger learner would have additional, superhuman performance 
policy data to learn from. 
5.2 Merging Cars Game 
With the system successfully learning a simple fence escape game, it was 
expanded to learn the merging game to see the effect of its more complicated state 
and control space. Like the fence escape game, the merging game's dynamics were 
used in iGame* to construct the value function and policy. A graph of the 
approximated value function produced is provided in fig. 9. As in the fence escape 
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game, the value of states where the evader loses is indicated in the middle of the 
graph. DAgger was set up with similar settings to the previous game, with the 
exception of using a neural network with a different input size due to the increased 
state sizes of the merging game.  
 
Figure 9: The value function for the merging cars game. The x axis represents the 
position of the pursuer and the y axis the evader. There is a clear collision zone 





The merging imitation student was also able to learn iGame*'s policy and 
produces comparable control values. Both iGame*'s policy and the student 
completed merging simulations more slowly than the fence escape game, but iGame* 
experienced considerably more slowdown. iGame*'s policy requires on average 
147.6ms to complete the simulation while fetching the control values, while the 
imitating student only required 61.4ms to generate its solutions (a 58% decrease in 
required time). Interestingly, the runtime of referencing the plain policy increased 
77.6% compared to the student's increase of 46.8%, showing that the imitation 
learner much more efficiently generalizes to complex environments, such as those 
found on autonomous vehicles. The large increase in runtime compared to the fence 
escape game is likely do to searching through the much larger dictionary of states 
required in the more complicated state space of the merging game. The student 
compresses the policy and reduces the effect of the increased state size. 
6. Future Work and Discussion 
In both test cases, the imitation learner was able to model the policy created 
by iGame*. Going forward however, there are improvements and extensions to the 
system that would make it more applicable to an autonomous vehicle. The resulting 
policy learned by the student relies, like its game theory based expert, on having a 
full knowledge of the state space in order to derive the correct controls. Tracking 
neural nets exist that are feasible for use in a real time environment, with the ability 
to track objects at upwards of 100fps (Held, David, et al.). Any error in tracking, 
however, that would translate into incorrect state information would cause this 
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system to generate incorrect controls. An imitation learner utilizing input 
remapping, or learning the correlation between controls and the image input 
directly, would avoid this issue. 
iGame* itself is also very sensitive to its initial parameters. The value of the 
dispersion at the start of the algorithm, for instance, is determined by the user, and it 
must be not too small or too large in order for states to be able to find their 
neighbors but not consider too much of the state space. Dispersion values that are 
improperly scaled result in inaccurate value functions. It is possible to compute a 
good starting value of the dispersion for less complex games, such as fence escape, 
but for state spaces more complex than the merging game calculation becomes less 
intuitive. A more efficient way to estimate a good value for the initial dispersion 
would decrease the time spent tuning iGame*, and would increase the accuracy of its 
final policy. 
7. Conclusion 
We set up two test cases to test the ability of imitation learning to model a 
discretely approximated policy as a continuous control policy. The fence escape 
game showed that our system architecture could learn a policy generated by iGame* 
and the merging game showed that the process is generalizable to more complex 
environments. Modeling situations faced by autonomous vehicles as differential 
games provides a vehicle with measures to predict how other agents in its 
environment may react to its own actions and goals so that their future positions can 
be estimated. This knowledge allows a vehicle to make control decisions to avoid 
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future collisions. Although the environment faced by an autonomous vehicle may be 
complex, the iterative sampling methods used in iGame* should be able to generate 
the value function given sufficient processing time, and the resulting policy can be 
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